

## SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE: ORGANIZATION FOR THE LONG WAR

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

## **SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE: ORGANIZATION FOR THE LONG WAR**

by

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United States Army

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## **ABSTRACT**

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KEY TERMS: Security Force Assistance (SFA), Modular Brigade Augmented for Security Force Assistance (MB-SFA), Stability Transition Team (S-TT), Foreign Security Force (FSF)

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The Army has identified the modular Brigade Combat Team (BCT) as the organizational structure to conduct the Army's Security Force Assistance (SFA) mission. This paper examines the overall ability of the brigade combat team to execute the SFA mission. It analyzes the BCT organizational structure and core capabilities against its SFA mission tasks and the lessons learned from recent deployments. The intent of this analysis is to identify gaps in manning and training to enable the Army to further improve planning, preparation and execution of the BCT in support of Security Force Assistance.

## SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE: ORGANIZATION FOR THE LONG WAR

Security Force Assistance has been a practice of the United States throughout its long and storied history.<sup>1</sup> Security assistance allows the United States to remain engaged with countries whose conflict or impending conflict impacts U.S. national interest. This form of assistance allows the U.S. to provide a measured commitment of forces and equipment, and if required is postured to quickly respond with increased military and civilian support.<sup>2</sup>

Field Manual (FM) 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, defines security force assistance as the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. Security force assistance (SFA) improves the capability and capacity of host-nation or regional security organization's security forces. These forces are collectively referred to as foreign security forces, including but not limited to military, paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; and prison guards and correctional personnel—that provide security for a host nation and its relevant population or support a regional security organization's mission.<sup>3</sup>

General Dempsey, Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command identified the two pillars of security force assistance, the modular brigade and the Soldiers acting as advisors.<sup>4</sup> The modular brigade forms the core of the organizational structure and is subsequently augmented with personnel and equipment according to the specific SFA mission requirements. Once the brigade receives the security assistance mission, it conducts a detailed mission analysis to identify the additional requirements.<sup>5</sup>

Security force assistance is a critical component of Stability Operations. Our military can clear and hold terrain, but without the ability of the host nation to provide for its own long-term security, a stable and secure environment is out of its grasp.<sup>6</sup> In a counterinsurgency the center of gravity is the people. An effective government able to provide security and stability for its population will ultimately lead to defeating an insurgency. The security force assistance mission performs a major role in developing an effective security sector and government.<sup>7</sup>

The Army's current role in providing security assistance to Foreign Security Forces (FSF) is achieving much success. The brigade combat teams, however, are experiencing challenges in manning, equipping and training to conduct this complex and difficult mission. As the Army emerges from a generation of training for conventional threats oriented on offensive and defensive operations, leaders and Soldiers must shift their way of thinking to effectively conduct full spectrum operations. This represents a significant change in how conventional Army units have trained in the past.<sup>8</sup>

In the security force assistance mission, BCTs must not only train on defeating an enemy through offensive, defensive and stability tasks, but must also know how to advise, assist and enable foreign security forces to take the lead. Security force assistance adds not only a new set of tasks to train to, but also requires a change in a way of thinking. SFA is a doable mission, but one that requires a universal paradigm shift to effectively execute the mission.<sup>9</sup>

#### The Modular Brigade Augmented for Security Force Assistance (MB-SFA)<sup>10</sup>

The BCT is capable of providing command and control in autonomous operations from brigade to platoon level for extended periods. It can also provide internal security as well as conduct offensive and defensive tasks in major combat operations as

required.<sup>11</sup> As indicated below and as part of the new Department of the Army (DA) approved Full Spectrum Operations Mission Essential Task Lists (FSO METL), Stability Operations is included as a mission essential task the brigade combat team must be able to execute.<sup>12</sup>

DA Approved Infantry Brigade Combat Team FSO METL:

- Conduct Command and Control (ART 5.0)
- Conduct Offensive Operations (ART 7.1)
- Conduct Defensive Operations (ART 7.2)
- Conduct Security Operations (ART 6.7.3)
- Conduct Stability Operations (ART 7.3)
- Employ Fires (ART 3.0)<sup>13</sup>

Integral to successful stability operations is the security force assistance mission conducted by the brigade combat team.<sup>14</sup> Over the past several years, many papers, studies, books, lessons learned, AARs and doctrine were developed to assist the BCT in effectively manning, equipping and training the force for the security force mission. BCTs conducting the security force assistance mission have increased their focus to prepare for offensive and defensive operations as well as stability and security operations. Given this additional requirement in a routinely compressed preparation timeline, the BCT has the complex task of developing a detailed plan to prepare for the SFA mission. Because the Institutional Army is still developing how to man, train and equip the BCT conducting the SFA mission, the BCT must do much of the heavy lifting on its own. When tasked to for SFA as part of stability operations, the BCT must



conduct a thorough mission analysis to determine the unique manning, equipping and training task requirements to prepare the BCT for its specific SFA mission.<sup>15</sup>

#### MB-SFA Tasks/Capabilities Requirements versus Training/Manning Gaps.

The once believed notion that units with core combat skills focused on major combat operations could easily adapt to other types of operations such as stability operations in a counterinsurgency is not altogether valid.<sup>16</sup>

There is a *Mission to Task* training and manning gap that exists in the BCT in supporting its security force assistance mission. The way ahead is to identify the gaps between the security force assistance mission requirements and the unit's capabilities. Then determine if the brigade combat team can meet these gaps with additional training or if additional augmentation is required.

Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations, identifies the five overarching tasks that provide the BCT the doctrinal foundation for conducting security force assistance. The Stability Operations Essential Tasks from FM 3-07 include, establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services, support governance, and support to economic and infrastructure development.<sup>17</sup> The Stability Operations Essential Task List highlights requirements for the BCT to support host nation governance, economic and infrastructure development and essential services that are not fully resident in the brigade combat team. To assist in these functional areas the MB-SFA requires additional training, augmentation or in country team support.<sup>18</sup>

Field Manual 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, provides a refined task list and guidance to the modular brigade combat team conducting security assistance.<sup>19</sup> Security force assistance is an integral part of stability operations in developing military and civilian security forces as part of Security Sector Reform (SSR) covering a broad

span of tasks to assist in shaping a stable environment.<sup>20</sup> The Security Force Assistance Essential Task List is the core focus for the MB-SFA mission.

Security Force Assistance Essential Tasks (FM 3-07.1):

- Organize
- Train
- Equip
- Rebuild and Build
- Advise and Assist<sup>21</sup>

An assumption is that the MB-SFA is augmented to support capability requirements outlined in FM 3-07.1 based on three operational phases. Phase I-Initial Response Phase, Phase II-Transformation Phase, and Phase III-Fostering Sustainability Phase.<sup>22</sup> The following description of the three operational phases provides the basis for later assumptions on MB-SFA requirements and capabilities.

The primary purpose for establishing SFA phases is to assist the BCT in planning and organizing for the security assistance mission, acknowledging the effect of the changing environment on the mission requirements.<sup>23</sup> Field Manual 3-07.1 states that BCTs conducting SFA can begin operations at any phase and move any direction through phases as the operational environment requires.<sup>24</sup> All three phases focus on assistance in developing capability and capacity of the host nation's foreign security force (FSF). Associated with each phase is a manning table that provides the BCT a generic baseline list of capabilities required and the recommended manning augmentation. The functional areas identified include: Military Police to assist provincial and district police, JAG to assist in rule of law and judicial procedures, Public Affairs,

Civil Affairs to assist with essential services and economic development, Engineers with emphasis on Explosive Ordinance Detachments (EOD), Sociocultural Experts to assist in contracting, Military Transition Teams (MTT) or Stability Transition Teams (S-TT) as FSF advisors and embedded ePRTs to assist in stability, reconstruction and governance. Manning requirements change by phase based on changing conditions in the environment.<sup>25</sup>

Phase I, Initial Response Phase, focuses on clear and hold. In phase I the MB-SFA assists FSFs in establishing security and defeating the local threat. During this phase SFA begins building FSF capacity and capability. The environment in this phase is non-permission and is heavily reliant on ePRTs for reconstruction and stability assistance and S-TTs to provide advise and assist support to host nation forces.<sup>26</sup>

Phase II, Transformation Phase, begins a primary shift focus to hold and build. The key trigger to initiate this phase is the shift from a non-permissive to a permissive environment. The preponderance of augmentation requirements remains heavily reliant on ePRT and the S-TT advisors.<sup>27</sup> Once permissive conditions exist civilian experts can begin to fill support role of the ePRT. In the Transformation Phase FSFs begin to rely less on SFA in support of tactical operations with more reliance on enabling assistance.<sup>28</sup>

Phase III, Fostering Sustainability Phase, marks a major shift from building capacity and capability and focuses on a more broad based assistance in stabilizing and sustainment of the FSF. In Phase III MB-SFA unit begins to withdraw from the host nation with emphasis on augmentation shifting to civil affairs, legal teams, and ePRT to assist in broader stability and reconstruction efforts.<sup>29</sup>

As a note, it is not uncommon for phases to overlap due to different stages of development throughout the MB-SFA operational area. Commanders must continue to assess development throughout the MB-SFA area to maintain a good understanding of the MB-SFA operating environment.<sup>30</sup>

The previous sections established a fundamental starting point for the remainder of this examination. The next section identifies the specific tasks and capabilities required to conduct SFA in order to determine if the MB-SFA is effectively manned and trained to accomplish the SFA mission. Training for the purpose of this section is primarily focused on individual training levels. A more comprehensive review on training is examined in a subsequent section of this paper.

A common training requirement that is identified throughout the next section is the need to train in host nation culture, language, and an understanding of FSF systems, operations, and procedures.

### Security Force Assistance

The primary tasks of Security Force Assistance as outlined in 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, focuses on the following categories: organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild and Build, and Advise and Assist.<sup>31</sup> This review begins with *Organize the Force*.

*Organize*. The organize task consists of the MB-SFA assisting security forces with improving their ability to organize military and civilian security forces and to operate under established administrative systems and processes, while sustaining the force.<sup>32</sup>

The specified tasks required to advise, assist and partner the host nation's security forces with *Organizing* include recruiting, promotion screening and selection, pay and benefits, leader recruiting and selection, and demobilization of security force personnel.<sup>33</sup>

The MB-SFA is capable of partnering with comparable type and size FSF organizations based on the requirements of *Organize*. The MB-SFA can support larger organizations if the supported FSF units are located together. MB-SFA possesses most of the technical skills to execute the tasks related to *Organize*; however, the MB-SFA must also balance its support to FSF with supporting the internal requirements of the brigade.<sup>34</sup> As a general rule, the S-TT advisors who augment the MB-SFA do not possess the correct military occupational specialties or training to assist in supporting these primarily administrative requirements.<sup>35</sup> The MB-SFA is, therefore, reliant on its core administrative personnel to support these functions.

MB-SFA training focus for all six subtasks of *Organize* may need to concentrate on learning and understanding the FSF administrative systems, processes, and procedures. The FSF and U.S. administrative systems likely differ, and the existing FSF systems already used accepted throughout the FSF. As a note, technical support compatibility and legal limitations are issues that must be analyzed and resolved.

The first subtask of *Organize* is recruiting. The BCT is not manned with a recruiting officer or NCO. The BCT does have trained retention NCOs at brigade and battalion levels to support retention functions, and could potentially provide recruiting support if additional recruiting training or augmentation to support with specific recruiting functions is provided.<sup>36</sup> Partnering MB-SFA and S-TT advisors can assist recruiting efforts to ensure FSF recruiting is legitimate and representative of the local community. A second category in recruiting is leader recruiting and selection. The MB-SFA leadership is capable of influencing leader recruitment and selection.<sup>37</sup>

The second subtask of *Organize* is promotion screening and selection, personnel accountability. Organic to the MB-SFA headquarters are a 13 man personnel section at brigade level and a 10 man personnel section at battalion level. The MB-SFA's capacity is limited due to internal requirements. The MB-SFA does have resident capability to provide personnel advise, assist and training support to FSF military and civilian personnel in administrative and personnel services support.<sup>38</sup>

The third subtask of *Organize* is pay and benefits. There is limited financial management capability internal to the MB-SFA to provide assistance for pay and benefits. The MB-SFA personnel section is capable of basic military pay coordination assistance, but does not possess the military occupational specialties or training to support financial management activities.<sup>39</sup> A finance detachment is deployed to support the MB-SFA and is generally located near the brigade for military pay and benefit purposes. The finance detachment is not under brigade control. The MB-SFA could provide financial management assistance to FSF if augmentation is supported with specific financial management skills.<sup>40</sup>

The final subtask of *Organize* is demobilization of security force personnel. The focus of demobilization is the establishment of military programs to discharge poor performing Soldiers and Leaders. The importance of this task stems from the challenge and concerns for building capacity using a changing and volatile population source with ineffective vetting processes.<sup>41</sup> The MB-SFA is capable of providing counseling, Soldier standards, leader values, and performance evaluation training and assistance to the FSF. The MB-SFA would require additional training or augmentations to assist with implementing programs requiring financial separation programs associated with Soldier

separation.<sup>42</sup> In addition to demobilization of FSF personnel, there may also be the requirement to demobilize local insurgent group or militias; an example of this is the active warlords and militias in Afghanistan. The MB-SFA is capable of assisting in demobilization of groups and militias. The MB-SFA could assist FSF and host nation government in reintegration programs once provided the training.<sup>43</sup>

*Train.* The modular brigade combat team is well suited to train basic core skills in individual, Leader and collective tasks in a full spectrum environment and to develop training and education programs to assist foreign security forces build its security capability.<sup>44</sup> The specified tasks required to advise, assist and partner with the host nation's security forces include training the U.S. trainer, establishing training standards, training foreign security forces, training leaders, and employing newly trained forces.<sup>45</sup>

The MB-SFA is fully capable of training FSF organizations and in establishing the associated training programs to develop long-term training capability. The MB-SFA can partner/advise up to division (s) level depending on the scope of the FSF organization, readiness capability, geographical dispersion of units, level of threat activity etc. Supported by Stability Transition Teams (S-TT) the MB-SFA's reach of support is extended. The extended capability is relative to the experience level of the STT advisors.<sup>46</sup>

The first of the five distinct SFA doctrinal areas in *Training Foreign Security Forces* is Training U.S. Trainers. A key imperative for training Soldiers and leaders for the SFA mission is proficiency in the MB-SFA's own full spectrum operations core competencies.<sup>47</sup> A second key imperative is to have a basic knowledge and understanding of the host nation cultural background and language (a basic use of

introductory words and phrases). The final imperative is to have an understanding of FSF processes and procedures in the conduct of FSF operations.<sup>48</sup> One of the key functions as a trainer is to assess training and provide feedback to the FSF partner. The Security Force Assistance Handbook developed at Fort Benning, GA provides assessment tools and guidance for the FSF trainer.<sup>49</sup> The After-Action Review (AAR) is a facilitator process that can enhance training and assessment of FSFs. The AAR is conducted IAW Training Circular (TC) 25-20, A Leaders Guide to After Action Reviews. Important to the overall success of the FSF After-Action Review process is the effective use of interpreters to ensure a clear understanding of the training action and corrective action is understood by the FSF training audience.<sup>50</sup>

The second subtask in *Training Security Forces* is Establishing Training Standards. Common practice in the U.S. Army and BCTs is standardized training. The MB-SFA is capable of establishing standards and metrics for assessing training of the FSF using the Army's 8 Step Training Model.

An area that may require MB-SFA leader attention is the training and mentorship of FSF leaders both officers and non-commissioned officers. The MB-SFA commander may want to consider partnering his subordinate leaders matched against FSF leader based on strengths and personalities.<sup>51</sup>

A third and central subtask is *Training Foreign Security Forces*. The MB-SFA is capable of task organizing its' battalions into smaller training groups that can train a greater number of units on individual, Leader and small unit collective tasks. Training capacity of the MB-SFA is dependent on the brigade's mission requirements, existing training level of the FSF, the specific task organization of MB-SFA, as well as the



existing threat activity, in the MB-SFA operating environment. In less threat areas the training environment supports an increase in the number of small, decentralized training groups and the number of training patrols.<sup>52</sup>

Limited by MB-SFA capacity is the ability to conduct staff training beyond Brigade or Division level based on the required rank and experience of staff officers. S-TT Advisors can provide assistance in filling this gap. Identified as a constraint is a requirement for advisors to be no less than one rank lower than their counterparts they advise.<sup>53</sup> Partnering MB-SFA companies with FSF battalion's is generally accepted; however, there is an experience gap associated with a company commander and headquarters element supporting battalion level operations.<sup>54</sup>

A second identified capability gap exists in the MB-SFA's ability to effectively partner with host nation law enforcement. Law enforcement can include district to provincial civilian police, border police, special team police, and FSF military police, the latter is a growing focus in FSF militaries.<sup>55</sup> The MB-SFA's internal military police platoon is capable of assisting FSF police forces, but lacks the capacity without augmentation to effectively support multiple police units. The MB-SFA is often required to use conventional ground forces as police trainers and should be prepared to plan and execute police training as part of the MB-SFA pre-deployment preparation.<sup>56</sup> An option to the MB-SFA Commander is augmenting their training force with foreign security force trainers. The integration of host nation forces can relieve manning issues, and build partner relations between host nation and U.S. forces.<sup>57</sup>

A third capability gap exists in the MB-SFA's capacity to support judicial system requirements without the appropriate level of augmentation. Judicial system functions

range from district to provincial level. The judicial system is an essential component of security assistance covering a wide range of tasks from rule of law to converting targeting intelligence into evidence that can be used to convict insurgents and criminals.<sup>58</sup> The MB-SFA is organically task organized with a brigade legal team, but lacks the capacity to provide assistance beyond internal brigade legal support activities. The MB-SFA legal activities include administrative tasks as well as operational tasks.<sup>59</sup>

A fourth gap exists in the MB-SFA's limited capability to support local government in stability and reconstruction. Augmenting the MB-SFA to fill this gap is the embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team (ePRT).<sup>60</sup>

The PRT provides military and civilian partnership to assist the host nation government with improving government administration and reconstruction efforts. An ePRT can include representation from the Department of State, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Justice, Department of Education and other key governmental experts. The ePRT also includes a military element, generally in support of security. The ePRT can be military or civilian led. The Afghanistan ePRT lead is military while the Iraq ePRT is civilian.<sup>61</sup> The ePRTs are the centerpiece in the development of host nation governments and should be decisively engaged when executing the SFA mission. A challenge for the ePRT remains its ability to fill the ePRTs with the residential civilian government experts to physically support the in-theater stability mission. Civilian positions not filled in the ePRT are either left vacant or is filled with assistance by the military.<sup>62</sup>

Providing the overarching training and support structure for building capacity and capability of FSFs in Afghanistan is the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan / Combined

Transition Team Support Team-Afghanistan (NTM/CSTC-A),<sup>63</sup> The combined organization performs a variety of functions in developing host nation security force capacity and capability. NTM/CSTC-A provides the critical oversight for the building of FSF units supporting organization and development of FSF military and civilian police units, establishment of institutional training, long-term sustainment program development, and logistics support etc.<sup>64</sup>

The key takeaways from this past section on training is the need for the MB-SFA to conduct a thorough analysis of requirements to either request external support or develop training plans to use existing manpower. It is also critical to identify all organizations that directly or indirectly impact the MB-SFA security mission.

*Equipping the Force.* The task of *equipping* a FSF includes developing a maintenance program for existing FSF equipment, and procuring, fielding and maintaining new equipment.<sup>65</sup>

The MB-SFA possesses the basic manning required to provide assistance in *Equipping the Force* at FSF Brigade level. A review was made in the areas of sustainment operations, providing logistics support, and distribution management and the sub-tasks associated with these tasks. To support operations the MB-SFA is organized with a brigade support battalion (BSB) headquarters company, distribution company, and maintenance company. Each battalion is supported by a forward support company (FSC) capable of similar functions and linked to the BSB.<sup>66</sup>

The requirement to procure like host nation equipment or comparable systems and requirements for distribution above division level may require Echelons Above Brigade (EAB) support or interagency support. These processes should be identified

during the MB-SFA mission analysis of Foreign Security Systems and requirements.<sup>67</sup>

The MB-SFA should understand the host nation's procurement systems and be prepared to identify additional support requirements after arriving in theater.<sup>68</sup> This is another example where it is important for MB-SFA to identify external U.S or coalition supporting agencies such as contracting support and NTM/CSTC-A.

To effectively support operations, the MB-SFA may consider co-locating sustainment sections to assist in training and developing processes and systems. The S-TTs advisors with the appropriate experience can also provide additional planning and operational support.

Primary training considerations for MB-SFA organizations should be placed on understanding existing systems and processes of the supported FSF. These FSF systems (vehicles, weapons, and communications) may differ from U.S. equipment and require additional training. There is little probability of training on FSF like systems before deploying; therefore, units will need to develop training plans to develop a general knowledge of systems and parts before deploying and continue training once on the ground.

*Rebuild and Build the Security Force.* The *rebuild and build* task consists of assess, rebuild and build existing capabilities and capacities of FSF and their supporting infrastructure.<sup>69</sup>

The capabilities to support the FSF in *rebuild and build* include general engineer support, and contracting support. An early reconnaissance to survey potential requirements or review previous assessments of rotating units is useful in identifying requirements to create, improve and integrate facilities. The MB-SFA should conduct a

thorough assessment and not assume that all FSF units and installations are at the same level in order to prevent broad inaccurate assessments.<sup>70</sup>

Resident in the MB-SFA to provide general support for *build and rebuild* support is the engineer company(s), its actual organization varies between the different BCT types (HBCT, SBCT, ABCT, AABCT and IBCT).<sup>71</sup> The MB-SFA engineers can provide training and physical infrastructure support to FSFs. External augmentation requirements are determined through initial assessments and will depend on the level of infrastructure support required.<sup>72</sup>

An integral element of building or rebuilding infrastructure in support of Foreign Security Forces is the ability to contract the work. The dynamics of culture and language increase an already difficult process. In the MB-SFA there is limited contracting capability, and must be augmented to provide contract support to assist in the task of *build and rebuild*. The MB-SFA's S4 can provide limited capability but does possess the capacity to effectively support FSFs. Contract training of MB-SFA personnel may support small level projects, but is insufficient for larger infrastructure projects.<sup>73</sup>

*Advise and Assist*. The final task of Security Force Assistance as outlined in 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, is *Advise and Assist*.

The MB-SFA is capable of advising and assisting FSF without augmentation, but is limited by capacity of advising beyond the brigade/division level. When augmented by Stability Transition Teams (S-TT), the MB-SFA is capable by SFA phases of supporting from one to three division sized elements.<sup>74</sup>

Augmentation of externally supported advisors provides the MB-SFA the ability to provide advisor assistance to a greater number of FSF units. The Army Stability

Transition Teams (S-TT) composition is a mix of externally resourced officers in the rank major to colonel and internally resourced non-commissioned officers and enlisted.

Figure 1 depicts a typical S-TT.<sup>75</sup>




Figure 1. Example of a MB-SFA Stability Transition Team<sup>76</sup>

Task organizing unit augmentation based on experience and capability is important to ensure leaders are well suited to support their specific advisory roles.<sup>77</sup> One of the challenges the MB-SFA commander faces in organizing the force is the late arrival of S-TT advisors in the pre-deployment training cycle, often not arriving before the MB-SFA conducts its Mission Readiness Exercise (MRE).

Once the advisory team organization is established, a training plan is implemented to prepare the teams for the unit's deployment. In the Army's increasing

efforts to improve how it prepares for and executes its SFA mission, the Army has taken steps to standardize training programs to facilitate the train up of the MB-SFA and advisory teams. The 162<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Brigade, Fort Polk, LA is a training support brigade that provides unit and augmented advisory team training to prepare units for the SFA mission. The Training Brigade is capable of conducting training at its home station at Fort Polk, the MB-SFA home station, or in conjunction with the MB-SFA MRE <sup>78</sup>

The 162<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Brigade training program is conducted in four blocks: Block A) Advisor Course for Augmented Advisors, Block B) Warrior/Deployment Task Training, Block C) Tactical Leader Seminar, and Block D) Advisor / FSF Staff EX. <sup>79</sup>

Block A) Advisor Course for Augmented Advisors is a 10-day training block focusing on advisory training in a COIN operating environment. The primary training audience for this block of training is the externally augmented advisors.

Block B) Warrior/Deployment Task Training is training focused on Shoot, Move and Communicate tasks that support the MB-SFA's deployment mission. The training is conducted by the MB-SFA according to the brigade's pre-deployment training plan.

Blocks C) Tactical Leader Seminar is a 3-day block of training for staff and leader integration. The training focus is advising and partnering in a COIN environment.

Block D) Advisor / FSF Staff Exercise is a 3-day command training exercise. This is a culminating event that exercises the command, staff and advisor teams working through a foreign security force problem scenario. <sup>80</sup>

#### Institutional Training in Preparation for Security Force Assistance

The Army's training institution is rapidly working to tie emerging doctrine with standardized training manuals to support Stability Operations and the Security Force Assistance Mission. An important step in the institutional development is the

establishment of a Security Force Assistance Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS) to provide an overall strategy for training the force in SFA. Common Task Training (CTT) manuals, battle drills (BD), basic and advanced schooling, doctrine and policy have all been playing catch up to meet the needs of the U.S. and coalition in counterinsurgency operations.<sup>81</sup>

It is evident that stability operations supported by security force assistance will remain on the Army's scope for the near future. It is therefore necessary that the Army continues to work on shaping its training institutions to ensure we effectively prepare the force for the complexities of Stability Operations and Security Force Assistance in a Full Spectrum Environment.

While the Army struggles with how to fight and win in a full spectrum environment, COIN versus Major Combat Operations (MCO), it will need to determine a balanced approach in our institutional training system to effectively support both.

In the interim, commanders will continue to be faced with a myriad of tasks to ensure the organization is prepared to execute fairly broad set missions. Commander's must manage their time closely to train and maintain critical core capabilities that are easily lost if not practiced i.e. fire support skills, mechanized and armor gunnery and maneuver skills. The BCTs often use armor and fire support units in the motorized/dismounted role and therefore have to prioritize which types of tasks to be trained.

Army training institutions are now introducing stability operations from basic to advance enlisted and officer training. As the Army finds a balance in its warfighting



curriculum, Soldiers and leaders will become more evenly grounded in a full spectrum of operations.

Leaders and staffs need to continue to be creative in the resourcing and execution of full spectrum training. Commanders should not expect to be organized or equipped how they will fight during their initial reset phase, and possibly into their initial phase of training. It is important not to fall into the trap of *not training* for lack of personnel and equipment. Commanders need to be judicious with all opportunities to prepare their organization for deployment.<sup>82</sup>

To support training gaps commanders should plan and coordinate for a number of development programs designed to fill the institutional training gap. The use of simulation exercises, Mobile Training Teams (MTT), Combat Training Center (CTC) exercises, and advisory team training are some examples of training the force in a constrained resource environment.

Combat training centers, both the National Training Center (NTC) and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) have made significant progress in the development of current world scenarios, supported by state of the art technology to provide realistic and relevant training. As the security force assistance mission grows, the CTCs are also addressing challenges to better prepare the brigades for the SFA mission. The NTC for example, employs over a thousand role players, replicating host nation Army, police, government officials, civilians, local leaders, businessmen and insurgents operating in multiple provinces with numerous districts, Forward Operating Bases (FOB) etc.<sup>83</sup>

The NTC has developed a plan for training Security Training Teams (S-TT) during Reception, Staging, Onward-movement & Integration (RSO&I) and have designed situational training exercise (STX) lanes to exercise the S-TTs advisory skills.<sup>84</sup>

The SFA mission has stretched the NTC when setting the conditions for a MB-SFA. A MB-SFA can arrive to the NTC with more than a dozen S-TTs. This combined with the MB-SFA partnering tasks and the requirement for trained FSF role often exceeds the CTCs capacity to effectively fill all of its roles. This is an example of where manning increases can further support the training institution in support of Stability Operations in a Full Spectrum Environment.<sup>85</sup>

The intent of this paper was to examine the BCT as the organizational structure designated to conduct the mission of Security Force Assistance. This paper concludes that the modular Brigade Combat Team is currently the right organization for the security force assistance mission, but not without caveats. The key factors affecting the BCT in conducting the SFA mission are, 1) inadequate doctrinal guidance required to execute SFA, 2) insufficient unit dwell time to organize, equip and train effectively for its SFA mission, while balancing the need to maintain training levels in critical core tasks, and 3) identification of several manning and training capability gaps despite the approved augmentation package. This requires the MB-SFAs to plan training against the additional tasks of security force assistance in an existing constrained resource environment.

## Endnotes

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